The main purpose of this paper is to critically investigate Price’s functional pluralism from the experientialist perspective, thereby offering a more plausible way to avoid Price’s difficulty in explaining the constraining ground for pluralistic variations. I pointed out that Price’s “functional pluralism” could not explicate why ‘scientific framework’ has the ‘perspectival primacy,’ and therefore, it should be confronted with the danger of a slide down to a nihilistic relativism. I suggest that Johnson’s experientialist account of the nature and structure of “the embodied experience” gives rise to a plausible answer to this problem. Drawing heavily on the growing body of empirical findings of the 2nd generation cognitive science, Johnson explicates the embodied experience in terms of “image schema” and “metaphorical mappings.” Image schemata are grounded in and formed at the level of our physical/bodily experience and extended to the mental/abstract level of experience in a non-rule-governed manner by means of metaphorical mappings. According to this account, varied perspectives that Price’s pluralism concerns are, in fact, the products of metaphorical mappings. And as Image schemata are formed at the “preconceptual, non-propositional” level, they present a salient level of commonality, regardless of perspectival variations. This means that image schema serves as the ground which constrains the arbitrariness of metaphorical extensions, through which perspectives vary. I conclude that Price’s notion of ‘perspectival primacy’ can be more appropriately explicated by adopting Johnson’s experientialist account of the embodied experience.