John Rawls' analysis of classical utilitarianism in A Theory of Justice(1971) pertains to the question of how utilitarianism's teleological character, i.e., its defining what is right as that which maximizes the good, leads to indifference to distributive concerns. In utilitarianism as a teleological theory of ethics, the good is defined independently from the right or independent of any moral concepts and principles. In contrast to this, Rawls claims, a deontological theory is defined as "one that either does not specify the good independently from the right, or does not interpret the right as maximizing the good"(Rawls 1999 [1971], p. 26). This distinction has been widely accepted for a while without serious challenges. Recently Will Kymlicka has argued that Rawls' characterization of utilitarianism as a teleological theory of ethics is seriously mistaken; that it depends on an artificial reconstruction of utilitarianism. His substantial claim is that utilitarianism is one way of spelling out the notion of equal regard for persons, and thus that it is as deontological as any other non-utilitarian theories. According to his interpretation, utilitarianism embodies the fundamental principle of treating people as equals by giving equal weight to each person's preferences, regardless of what they are preferences for. The principle of equality thus embodied provides a utilitarian basis for a fair social decision procedure. On this interpretation, maximization of utility is not the direct goal but "a by-product of a decision procedure that is intended to aggregate people's preferences fairly"(Kymlicka 1989, p. 25). In this paper I shall argue, against Kymlicka's interpretation, that utilitarianism is teleological in principle; that it is utterly pointless to deny that it is a goal-based theory at the substantive level. Maximization is not a by-product but a basic policy adopted to decide when one's sacrifice for another is justified. Utilitarianism does specify a notion of equality as impartiality at the fundamental level, as expressed in Bentham's dictum. However, commitment to equal regard at this fundamental level is not what distinguishes moral conceptions. What differentiate moral conceptions from one another are their moral principles at the substantive level which can actually tell us what we ought to do or what it is right for us to do. But Kymlicka misunderstands at which level Rawls' teleological/deontological distinction is supposed to work. It is supposed to work at the substantive level, not at the fundamental level of a moral conception. Kymlicka claims that all modern moral theorists accept that equal concern and respect is the fundamental moral principle. In a way, this claim expresses a truth. But it oversimplifies the matters involved, and contains serious misunderstandings about both Rawls and modern utilitarians.