This paper suggests the necessity of research on “embodied cognition” within “posthuman” studies, proposing a first exploration aimed at establishing a framework for the solidarity of “naturalistic posthumanism.” In contemporary discussions on posthumanism, the theoretical approaches are primarily divided between transhumanism and critical posthumanism. Transhumanism is an approach that, from the viewpoint of technological evolution, continues the Enlightenment’s anthropology grounded in the mind/body and subject/object dichotomy while ethically advocating for the rights of radical liberalism. In contrast, critical posthumanism roundly rejects all models of identity and exclusivity, as well as the radical thought inherent in transhumanism, relying on post-anthropocentrism or anti-dualism and promoting relational politics and ethics generated from transversal, nomadic, and vitalist subjects. In this context, I agree with the concerns of critical posthumanism, but I argue that exploring an alternative subject, free from the mind/body dichotomy, requires a thorough investigation into the model of embodied cognition. This issue concerns not just a discursive analysis of the body, but rather a cognitive analysis, which is a process of restoring the “erased body” that Hayles previously highlighted. I also believe that in the exploration of the conditions of the human and the non-human, or the intelligence of machines and humans, an understanding of the cognitive role of the body should precede any process that seeks to acknowledge cognitive differences and foster solidarity between them. Thus, this paper asserts, from a naturalistic perspective, integrating Dewey’s pragmatism and experientialist philosophy, that our cognition is embodied, and this process can be articulated through the perspective of imaginative cognitive activities, particularly in terms of the continuity between “image schemas” and “metaphorical thinking.” This will provide an open inquiry that can move beyond theoretical frameworks emphasizing either identity or difference alone, allowing for the acknowledgment of cognitive differences between humans and machines. Consequently, this article is the first exploration to open up “a narrative of cooperation” between them instead of a narrative of competition by examining the theoretical branches of posthumanism from the viewpoint of naturalistic philosophy.