Objectification generally refers to the phenomenon of a person being treated by another person as an object. As the phrase "as if" suggests, objectification reduces a person to an object when they are not actually an object, which is why it is considered ethically unacceptable. However, the possibility of benign or harmless objectification has been discussed by Martha Nussbaum, Cass Sunstein, and others, who argue that objectification can be benign in some contexts. This leads to the question of what contexts make this possible. This paper will examine and defend Nussbaum's answer to this question: trust relations based on narrative history make this possible. To do so, I will examine Nussbaum's argument for positive objectification, introduce a critique of it, and the accompanying argument that objectification may not be harmful when it is grounded in consent based on autonomy. I will then show that these consent-based arguments share problems with the autonomous authority model of consent and suggest that Nussbaum's answer avoids these problems by embracing a fair transaction model of consent. Consequently, I will argue that despite the importance of consent emphasized by consent-based arguments, trust relations are the more important consideration for benign or harmless objectification.