If we seek to justify our actions morally, we must demonstrate that the actions comport with moral principles. In other words, the justification for moral behavior should be accepted from a universal perspective. In the modern period, many philosophers and ethical theorists have argued that moral reasoning should accept demands for impartiality. This is what we call the 'impartiality thesis'. According to this thesis, when we try to make any moral judgments, we should not base particular importance on the needs or interests of people with whom we have particular relationships, and should try to judge from a neutral perspective as an impartial spectator. Other philosophers, however, disagree with the impartiality thesis in moral judgments. They claim that impartialists can not account for the duties and partialities required in special human relationships. In this paper, I focus on Brad Hooker's argument regarding the demand for impartiality in moral judgments. Through this, I argue that the demand for impartiality should be fulfilled in order to uphold the basis for justification in the moral judgment. The reason for my argument is that the needs of justification for moral rules is the universal requirement of moral systems to impose impartial authority on morality by minimizing indeterminacy and uncertainties in morality.