With today’s rapid technological advancements, there are beings that are different from humans, but enjoy everyday life alongside us. They are AI robots. With the development of technology that allows you to move a robot's arm with just a thought using brain waves, the question of the moral status of AI robots is still at the center of debate. The moral status of AI robots is still a major issue for philosophers and scientists to consider, as these robots, which are completely different from us, are living with us and will continue to live with us. Recently, a theory has emerged that attempts to defend the moral status of AI robots in a more intuitive way. This theory, called “ethical behaviorism,” is expected to be a new school of thought in the field of machine ethics: if an entity's behavior closely resembles that of a human being, we can give it the same moral status as us. We need to take a philosophical approach to answering this question. The purpose of this paper is to examine the justification of the position that attempts to defend the question of moral status as ‘behaviorism’. In doing so, we hope to contribute to the development of an appropriate theoretical foundation and systematic policy on the issue of the moral status of AI robots in the future.