Aristotle was regarded as the pioneer of the Western thought until the sixteenth century, but the development of modern science required some of his theories to be criticised and refuted. Among them is his teleology that all natural beings have their own purpose in actions. However, such scholars as Bolotin (1998) and Woodfield (1976) agree that such refutations were not based on any practical and decisive evidence, but rather derived from a dogmatic belief that the new theory of mechanism would be a better theory. That is, their denials of the theory were unsuccessful. In this paper, I shall focus on the teleology of inanimate beings and try to answer whether his teleology can be still accepted in modern times. For this, I shall first examine the significances and problems that the theory entails (Ch. 2) and the efforts made by Collingwood and Woodfield who tried to make teleology available today (Ch. 3). And then I shall argue that their attempts are unsuccessful and that the initial question of whether the natural motion of inanimate beings that have their principle of motion and rest in themselves still remains (Ch. 4).