Rorty takes the pursuit of redemption through the private sphere (such as religion, philosophy, and literature) as a problem of personal taste. He puts these discourses into a list of hobbies (such as birdwatching or collecting hubcaps). If religion, philosophy, and literature go into a list of hobbies, the nature of redemption which we pursue through these discourses will, in the end, result in a matter of the hobbies. If so, the way Rorty believes the western intellectuals went, is nothing more than a consistent process of pursuing some hobbies. The real problem of this view on the intellectual tradition is that it is hard for us to demarcate a community on philosophical, literary studies and a coterie. Rorty's emphasis on hobbies results in a kind of reductionism when we reduce redemption to a matter of some hobbies. Since the result of this process of reduction is a matter of the personal hobbies, the languages of religion, philosophy, and literature become private. This is truly a self-contradiction with pluralism, which Rorty has consistently pursued. Professor Sang Hwan Kim criticizes Derrida by charging him to be trying to provide a unitary and dogmatist definition of metaphysical transcendence. Professor Kim worries that Derrida's deconstructionism may have interpreted the history of philosophy one-sidedly. Derrida, however, claims that he has never interpreted philosophy or metaphysics unilaterally. Professor Kim regards the closure that Derrida imposes on metaphysics as nontemporal space of thought and as a range of extension. Professor Kim also regards deconstruction as a kind of methodological strategy. Derrida, however, emphasizes that there is never "the" metaphysical, the "closure" being not a circular limit bordering a homogeneous field. Deconstruction is not a ready made methodological program or strategy deductively applied to any text. It is rather a kind of inductive process that begins with the concrete deconstruction of individual text and derives indirectly the so-called meta discourses on philosophy from within. Professor Kim claims that there is not only a closure but also an outside of it in metaphysical thinking. He believes that the issue of the comprehensive understanding of the nature of metaphysics can be raised and elucidated only from the view point from without. We argue that the history of philosophy outside the closure, conceptual thought and conceptual language outside the closure of conceptual thought and conceptual language, are impossible. We conclude that any excursion to the outside of the closure is destined to be given back to the inside of the closure when it is predicated in terms of a conceptual language.