This paper seeks to clarify that artificial intelligence can not be the subject of aesthetic experience in terms of Searle’s “Background” and the aesthetic experience of Dewey. I believe that art of the posthuman era also is confronted with the problem of “indiscernibility,” as Danto’s analysis of contemporary art. Instead, this concept does not refer to the relation between perceptibly same things but is concerned with a new predicament called the “visual Turing test” through AICAN’s artworks provided by the Art&AI laboratory of Rutgers University. I, however, argue that artificial intelligence cannot be a voluntary artistic subject, even if the artworks successfully pass the visual Turing test. This is because, as per Searle’s argument, the languages/signs of artificial intelligence have only “derived intentionality,” wherein underlyingly lies the “Background” founded in “Intentionality.” At this point, I reveal that Searle’s Background is part of the aesthetic experience of Dewey and thereby is implicated in understanding of qualitative experience, since his Background consistently indicates the factors of “nonrepresentational and preintentional” world. It means that Dewey’s aesthetic experience signifies the meaning of pervasively qualitative thought in which there an “experienced world” emerges from “transaction” between body and its surrounding environment. Namely, the origin of artistic meaning is superficially not related to the articulation or manipulation of sign/language, but lies in qualitative experience. Consequently, I assert that artificial intelligence can be considered as a partner in the creative activity’s, not a voluntary subject of aesthetic experience itself, unless it can organize, feel, or comprehend the meanings emerged from the “experienced world.”